26/03/2011

Tinkering in tongues - on liturgies badly performed

I could probably be placed squarely within the audience James K.A. Smith imagines when he is writing. Having grown up in a pentecostal church, only to spend the past decade slowly moving towards Catholicism and even (...) 'Eastern' Orthodoxy, just being aware that Smith had written this book was a challenge to my self-image. Other books by the same author had provided bridges for my 'crossing-over', is he now trying to bring me 'back' across that gap? On the one hand I want him to be right. Indeed, if one could isolate what pentecostal churches do (at least in terms of social work etc) from their own often rather studdering attempts to articulate theological rationales, that would be great. On the other hand, if Smith is right, and Pentecostalism has 'something to offer' philosophically, then it also feels a little like I would have to reconsider quite much of my own 'journey' so far. And that would be uncomfortable, I guess, and I would probably prefer to avoid that. Who likes admitting they're wrong...?

James K.A. Smith is a very good writer with a rich toolbox of anecdotes and home-made hyphenated words (I know from his blog that he is consciously honing his writing skills - probably unlike many academic writers - and the result shows). Earlier he has written on how reformed Christian philosophy might benefit from interaction with anglo-catholic 'Radical Orthodoxy', how Evangelical apologists must not simply reject all that is called 'postmodern', and how Christian education lies embedded in the 'rhythms' of embodied, habitual, and collective practices rather than in the content of the curriculum. All very bold projects, considering Smith's largely Evangelical context.

His latest work(s) draws heavily on that of Charles Taylor, in particular on the concept of the social imaginary. In short, Smith takes 'social imaginary' to mean '(big) ideas implicit in practices', which is an OK short-hand for what Taylor is speaking of. On this (phenomenological) view, meaning resides not primarily in heads as propositional thoughts, but is rather 'always-already' embedded in collective habitual bodily conducts. (Like Taylor, Smith bypasses the question of the ontological relation between practices and discourses - the main point is that these are never entirely synchronized, and that the former is more vital). Smith then introduces the idea that this 'social imaginary' resembles notions carried in the word 'liturgy': our deepest desires are directing - as well as being directed by - the embodied 'common work' a group performs together. Then he can speak of the liturgies of shopping, the liturgies of higher education, you name it. Practices we take for granted can hence be analyzed as formative of our desires, as 'cultural liturgies', which might or might not conform to 'orthodox' theological articulations.

At this point, both self-proclaimed secularists and Catholics might hesitate. Smith anticipates the critique of the former (evoking familiar 'secular' names from scholarly fields with 'post' in front of them), but seems (to me at least) to neglect the latter, who might have objections regarding this 'watering down' of the Rite to simply include every collective practice in equal measure. In any case, I am willing to go quite far with Smith down this road (as would many catholic theologians as well). Personally, I am very warm to the idea that 'culture' should be assessed in terms of liturgy, (but then) taking the Eucharistic event as fundamental to all reality. And I like Smith's academic boldness, pure and simple. But in this book problems arise even for me.

I realize that my hesitance might stem from my own background and journey. When I was a teenager in a pentecostal church, the word 'liturgy' was meant to denote empty practices done by mere habit rather than by conviction. And that, so it went, was a really bad thing (as if habits could ever be 'mere', or practices ever be 'empty'). Of course, at a certain point you have to concede that 'we also have a kind of liturgy', and then encourage the services to be 'open' for 'interruption' so that authenticity might be preserved. At a certain point I began thinking that since 'everyone has a liturgy' the difference would have to be how well-performed and comprehensive these liturgies were, and that they should be somehow comparable. So I was hoping this book would have something to say on that. Maybe my notion (now conviction) that 'high church' liturgies are simply better than pentecostal ones must be qualified?

Smith's project is to tease out the big ideas that are implicit in the embodied, habitual, collective practices of pentecostal worship, and to show that these not only beat 'modern' reductive rationalism every time (which is probably true, as far as I'm concerned - but hey, that's an easy target), but that they are closer to traditional 'orthodoxy' than pentecostal articulations of doctrine itself sometimes tend to be.

There are several issues here. One question is what Smith thinks is the relation between the meanings he discerns in the practices of 'ordinary' pentecostal worshipers, and the somewhat different meanings these 'ordinary' worshipers (or even pentecostal theologians) are articulating. Smith grants that practice and articulated theory are not always in synchrony, but does not attempt to explain their actual or ontological relation. Here stops phenomenology, so Taylor would be excused for not going further, but why does not the theologian at least attempt to connect the two?

But much more importantly, there is something revealing about Smith's choice of 'field studies':

Smith wants to 'decode' the rhythms of pentecostal worship, and does so by referring to single events, single Sunday services treated as full examples of Pentecostal worship. It is for example telling that these events as they are described could be taking place at any time of the year. There is no sense in Smith's recaps of pentecostal worship of any 'long-term' rhythm, akin to the traditional church year, with its high and low points. And this is probably accurate. Had he attempted to do the same with Roman Catholic services, he would have had to consider the service in the context of the whole church calendar, with its slow ebbs and flows of different seasons.

And why would Smith limit pentecostal 'worship' to Sunday services, when all collective habits are supposedly 'liturgical'? Doesn't the 'flat' nature of the pentecostal church year signal any 'implicit understandings'? To me, it seems this aspect of the pentecostal social imaginary is far closer to the market/individualism Smith rejects than he would want to admit. Maybe the absence of a 'thick' annual calendar structure in pentecostal worship suggests that the 'overlap' with other (ultimately contradictory) social imaginaries is more problematic than Smith allows for. Because he isolates 'pentecostal' behaviour to Sunday services. Smith actually ends up ignoring the actual complexity of embodied life patterns, and how the 'market liturgies' (to take an example) penetrates into the 'pentecostal imaginary' itself.

Smith also bypasses any comparison of the centrality of preaching in pentecostal services with that of the Eucharistic event in 'higher' liturgies. He focuses on the centrality of embodied action in pentecostal services as an implicit critique of procrustean rationalistic categories. But is not in fact the sermon the central event in the pentecostal service, rather than the bodily actions that happen before (song) or after (alter call) it is delivered? While many elements in pentecostal worship emphasize the goodness of human embodiment, the very structural centrality of the sermon (as well as the architectural centrality of the pulpit) still imply a heavy leaning towards disembodied and 'unmediated' transmission of abstract and unchanging content.

If one compared the sermon as the central event in a pentecostal service with the Eucharist and sharing of bread and wine as the central event in a service in a(ny!) 'higher' church tradition, what would be the difference? My hunch is that such a comparative study might  reveal two very different 'ideal types' of the church (and here we might invoke catholic thinker Charles Taylor for support, this time against Smith) implicit in the two performances.

In the pentecostal service, then, the implied social imaginary would perhaps be one where fundamentally atomistic individuals come together for mutual benefit, centered on the transmission of a 'pure' message that they are then to 'apply' after hearing it. As the message "moves from our heads to our hearts", it can also 'seep into' the world outside. This is very akin to what Charles Taylor calls the modern social imaginary. For all its emphasis on embodied movements, it remains strictly modern as much as the market that Smith wants to provide an alternative for.

In the 'high' church service, the implication is that one single yet universal (!) event provides the eternal foundation for all other events in reality, including the individuals 'emerging' from its relational centre. The ontological 'archetype' implicit in the Eucharistic rite is one where relationality as such is fundamental and originary, and where all events (such as individuals) are ultimately such only by a kind of sharing in one single event - that of the Incarnation.

If we were to compare church years (longer term rhythms), or architectural organization, or what is the high point in the liturgical 'narration' (sermon or Eucharist), I still feel that Pentecostalism is 'modern', far too 'modern'. 

I have long been on a kind of journey from Pentecostalism to something kind of more 'catholic'. But I am not really more 'catholic' than 'pentecostal'. I don't really know what it would be right to call myself. My theory and practice are still out of sync, though I believe I am slowly catching up with myself. Smith's book unfortunately (because I was actually hoping a little - maybe that's why I'm a bit touchy) provides no answer to what for me was the question spurring my journey:

It's liturgy all right, but is it well-performed?

4 comments:

  1. Great post; I think you ask the right questions of modernity and its cultural forms. I wonder, though, why you hoped to see some sort of glimmer of light in this or or any of the 'modern' christianities. Our socioeconomic order is built upon disembodied, essentialist (or as you said, 'unmediated' - good word!) constructs that alienate the sort of realistic and semiosic consciousness required to sustain a more wholistic christianity.

    But I love your project. The hope of developing a popular Postsecularity is one I share. Have you heard of John Poinsot and John Deely, by any chance? The former's Tractatus De Signis is, I think, monumentally significant in this regard, both theologically and philosophically.

    Best,

    Arlyn Culwick

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  2. I think my hope was in Smith rather than his subject matter.

    But I am also hesitant to simply dismiss 'modernity' as something one can somehow move beyond, since this is indeed the 'modern' gesture per se. Even on a personal level, I cannot simply dismiss what has had a part in making me who I am, but must rather constantly re-work and re-imagine it. In this sense, nothing has ever actually been modern, since modernity can only be a kind of misunderstanding of itself.

    I have not yet encountered the work you mention, but thanks for pointers.

    Thanks for reading my blog and 'loving my project'. My PhD stuff does not however feature on this blog, which is more a collection of random musings than a systematic project. Ideally, there will be a publication after the PhD delving more into the very problematic of 'postsecularity'.

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  3. Yeah, I agree that it's important not to jump on the reactionary bandwagon in aiming to move beyond modernity. Synthesis is crucial. But I'm sure your work has a far more refined idea of the difficulties involved. I'd be interested to read what your views are on this.

    My hopes, for what they're worth, come from addressing the tensions within modernity itself - so that a resolution emerges as a completion and reconciliation (rather than a distancing) of previously fettered trajectories. (I suppose the same applies, if possible, on a personal level.)


    I'm not sure how centrally relevant those authors I mentioned will be to your work, since they tackle mostly metaphysical philosophical questions. But here's a (horribly brief) summary:

    Poinsot's semiotic is something unprecedented in history (published in 1632, but unnoticed until the 1980's). It's able to ground - in a systematic way - the kind of worldview you're angling at. Basically, it's the first (and probably only) systematic ontology of relations that succeeds in working out in what way relations (including generals and universals) can be real - that is, mind independent. Once that's dealt with, it simply outperforms the nominalism and idealism at the heart of modernity, making sense of its many conundrums.

    Coupled with Charles Peirce's work on semiosis, Poinsot's semiotic can mediate between scholastic and modern thought, and, by virtue of its internal requirements, transcend both. Deely's good on this.


    If your (post-) PhD work is made public, I'd love to be kept informed about it. It sounds fascinating.


    Cheers!


    Arlyn

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  4. Thanks.

    Very little on this blog is 'relevant' to my work anyway. Keep throwing in suggestions.

    From what I can quickly gather, Poinsot and Deely both stand squarely within a Dominican and Thomist tradition, so on some readings Poinsot's semiotic surely stem from Aquinas himself (another great synthesizer, so the historical 'tracing' could continue beyond him as well - Trinitarian ontologies of relation can be found in Augustine and Maximus before him, and in Cusa after him).

    Your points about nominalism and modernity are probably spot on. In fact, one might well argue that Kant and other 'proto-modern' thinkers are more influenced by a Franciscan strand of the scholastic debates than the Dominican one that the nineteenth- and twentieth-century neo-scholastics sought to recover and develop. The claim would then be similar to yours - this 'alternative modernity', the story goes, does not simply reject but rather outperforms (yes!) the modernity we have somehow received. It is somehow more truly modern than modernity itself.

    The issues at stake here have more to do with synthesizing than rejecting, as you rightly point out. The question is: if modernity is somehow, on some level, a deviation of any kind, then how is such deviation even possible on an ontological level? How can, one might say, Reality as such deviate from itself?

    The questions of the ontological status of sign-making and real relation clearly resonate with what have been my intuitive inklings about the status of human making and 'contribution' to Reality as such. This is relevant to the above because even 'mere illusion' must have SOME ontological status, and so questions about 'art' as a separate ontological field somehow miss the mark completely.

    I also agree that there must be a kind of simultaneous pointing-out of modernity's internal contradictions and unapologetic metaphysical speculation and synthesis that refuses to ignore what does not (any longer...) fit in.

    I'm gonna leave it at that. It would be great to have what you call a more refined idea of the issues involved (I think I had one here somewhere...), but my blog is just not meant for all that stuff. I am kind of a slow learner. I try and keep the blog playful and explorative. You know, pretend I have an open mind and all that. :-)

    Cheers,

    Stf

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